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Abstract 
This paper investigates the strategic use of cross-promotion for content producers in social media. In 
particular, we study how a producer chooses other producers to cross-promote so as to maximize the 
expected benefits of them cross-promoting him/her in return. Theories on homophily effect and social 
influence suggest that cross-promoted producers are more likely to cross-promote the initiator in 
return when they are in the similar categories or share more common friends and when the initiator 
has higher status. However, the cross-promotion from producers of different categories and social 
groups (i.e., share fewer common friends) tend to benefit the initiator more. The benefits also increase 
as the status of the initiator increases. We collected a panel of data consisting of 27,356 producers’ 
profile and status information, content categories, and their cross-promotion activities over a period 
of two months from YouTube. To test our hypotheses, we first employ a cox proportional hazard model 
to estimate the probability of cross-promotion in return. Then, we use a difference-in-differences 
method with panel fixed effects to evaluate the effect of cross-promotion in return on the initiator. Our 
results strongly support our hypotheses and provide valuable insights for both content producers and 
social media platforms.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much.” 
― Helen Keller 
Over the past decade, social media has revolutionized the communication between businesses, 
organizations, communities, and individuals. It integrates the explosive growth of user-generated 
content (UGC) with the help of social networking functions provided by social media websites. With 
the social networking functions, users can not only discover and consume content of interest but also 
interact and even collaborate with other users. Such social links are effective in helping content 
producers to form an interconnected community. As millions of content producers must compete 
strategically for attention, being well-connected can be a producer’s unique competitive advantage. By 
working with other producers through social connections, the generated cross-promotion and 
collaboration can be one of the most powerful ways to reach new audiences
1
. The cross-promotion 
from other producers, especially the well-established ones, can potentially direct the traffic for their 
content to their promoted producers’ content. Most producers cross-promoting others expect to be 
cross-promoted in return to achieve mutually beneficial relationships. However, by and large, all 
producers are competing with each other for attention. As such, producers may decide not to cross-
promote certain producers to avoid losing consumers, especially loyal followers, to cross-promoted 
producers. Therefore, the decision on cross-promotion can be complicated and also strategically 
important.   
This study aims to investigate how to choose other producers to cross-promote their content so as to 
increase the expected benefits for one’s own content. In the paper, we refer to the proactive producer 
who initiates the link as C producer and the reactive producer who receives the incoming link and then 
decides whether to link back as F producer. For producer C, the expected benefits of cross-promoting 
F are determined jointly by the probability of F cross-promoting C in return and the benefits of F’s 
cross-promotion on C. Therefore, we attempt to answer two research questions: (1) among all the 
producers that a producer has cross-promoted, which are more likely to cross promote him/her in 
return? (2) Which can generate more benefits for him/her if being cross-promoted in return? We 
explore the answers for the questions from the perspectives of social influence and homophily. Using 
data from the largest video-sharing website YouTube on a large number of users’ cross-promotion 
relationships and the consumption of their content over time, we find that among the cross-promoted 
producers, those with more similar content and more common friends are more likely to cross-promote 
the initiator in return, but more benefits for the initiator come from those with less similar content and 
less common friends. We also find that both the probability of the initiator being cross-promoted in 
return and the resulting benefits increase as the status of the initiator increases.     
This research contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we look at the cross-promotion 
as a way for users to collaborate for success in social media. Most studies on user generated content 
focus on incentives of user contribution and users’ contribution behaviour (Butler 2001; Koh et al. 
2007; Tang et al. 2012; Zeng & Wei 2013). Surprisingly little research has addressed the strategic 
collaboration among individual users. In the present study, we look beyond the individual behaviour of 
each user and examine the interaction between users. Second, this study examines the cross-promotion 
relationship between content producers as a unique type of social ties in online social networks. It is 
different from traditional friend relationship because of the competition between the two users. It is 
also different from the following or subscription relationship because in addition to being interested in 
the other user’s content, the initiator is essentially recommending the content to his/her 
followers/subscribers. Third, we contribute to the literature on social influence and homophily by 
empirically testing our hypotheses derived based on the theories. We adapt the definitions for friends 
and similarities to fit our setting of cross-promotional network. Finally, using data on both users’ 
                                              
1 http://www.reelseo.com/cross-promotion-youtube-video-collaborations/ 
  
content generation and social networking activities, the findings of this study will enrich our 
understanding of user behaviour in social media.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present a literature review in Section 2. Section 3 
describes our research context. Research hypotheses are introduced in Section 4. We then present the 
research data in Section 5. Section 6 presents empirical analysis and results. Finally, we discuss the 
findings and conclude with management implications in Section 7. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior studies on social links can be categorized into three topics according to the type of the link.  
2.1 Social Links between Content Consumers 
Social links between content consumers can facilitate the information exchange between the 
consumers. The relationship between two content consumers can be described by tie strength, which 
represents the closeness and interaction frequency between the two parties (Granovetter 1973). Strong 
social links exist between close friends who interact frequently and whose social circles overlap. In 
contrast, weak social links are social relationships with infrequent interactions, as commonly observed 
between acquaintances or strangers. Information from strong social links exhibits a stronger 
persuasive effect than that from weak social links  and thus recommendations from strong social links 
are more likely to be adopted (Brown & Reingen 1987; Bapna & Umjarov 2015).This is because 
information from strong social links is believed to be more personalized and relevant as compared to 
that from weak social links (Anand & Shachar 2009; Krackhardt 1992). However, messages from 
weak social links can be more effective in increasing users’ awareness of new information than those 
from strong social links (Van der Lans et al. 2010; De Bruyn & Lilien 2008; Godes & Mayzlin 2009). 
This is because weak social links often convey novel information or recommend products that are not 
easily discovered from one’s close social circle (Shi et al. 2014). 
2.2 Social Links between Content Consumers and Producers  
Prior studies on social links between consumers and producers focuse on how the link between a 
consumer and a producer affect both the consumer’s and the producer’s behavior. These links are 
often observed as consumers following or subscribing to the producer. For producers, these links can 
increase the consumption of their content and the formation of new links between other consumers and 
the producer (Susarla et al. 2012; Sheldon et al. 2011; Shi et al. 2014). For consumers, they can 
express their viewpoints or interact with other consumers in brand communities such as fan pages on 
Facebook or official micro-blogs on Sina micro-blog, to affect producers’ behaiors (Goes et al. 2014). 
Indeed, more than 1.5 million businesses have established brand communities for marketing purposes 
(Goh et al. 2013), which is consistent with the well-known Hawthorn Effect (Adair 1984), where the 
mere presence of observers can change behaviors. 
2.3 Social Links between Content Producers 
Existing empirical studies of social links between producers and producers in information systems 
have largely focused on how producers’ behaviors (social links) are affected by social links (producers’ 
behaviors) (Zeng & Wei 2013; Wang et al. 2015; Ma 2010) and the mechanism of such links (Stephen 
& Toubia 2010; Mayzlin & Yoganarasimhan 2012). On the one hand, social links can affect producers’ 
behaviors. For example, rating and content similarity between producers are generally higher after the 
formation of social links (Zeng & Wei 2013; Wang et al. forthcoming). On the other hand, producers’ 
behavior can also affect the formation of social links. Ma (2010) reveals that when producers produce 
higher volume of content, they are more likely to strategically initiate links and to “invite” 
reciprocation. Regarding the mechanism of this type of link, studies on the bidirectional links show 
that allowing online producers to link to one another can bring benefits to them because of the 
  
increased accessibility (Stephen & Toubia 2010; Jabr & Zheng 2014). More recently, studies begin to 
differentiate unidirectional links from bidirectional links, and find that although the producer may 
promote the rivals throuth these links, doing so improves the consumers’ inference about its quality 
and ultimately increases the traffic to its own content (Mayzlin & Yoganarasimhan 2012; Katona & 
Sarvary 2008). Our study falls into this category by studying the formation of social links between 
content producers and the influence of such links. 
3 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Established in February 2005, YouTube attracts more than 1 billion page views each month and over 
100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute
2
. YouTube provide users with strong 
functionality to allow users to interact socially. Users can subscribe to others’ uploaded content by 
subscribing to their channels. A user can unilaterally decide to subscribe to a producer, and the 
relationship does not have to be reciprocated. The subscribers would receive updated content from the 
subscribed channels but not the other way around.  
In March 2013, YouTube launched a new channel design for YouTube producers called "Channel 
One"
3
. It enables "Featured Channels" function that allows producers to cross promote other producers, 
serving as a form of endorsement of the promoted producer by the source producer, and make the 
promoted producer’s content easily accessible from the source (Figure 1). Ever since, many producers 
have cross promoted each other’s content on YouTube. Many reports suggest that it is an efficient way 
to gain more subscribers and viewers through such collaboration
4
. The cross promotion relationship 
does not have to be reciprocated either. The featured channel relationship between two producers can 
be no links, one-way links, or mutual links. 
 
Figure 1. Featured Channels in one YouTube channel page. 
Figure 2 shows both the subscription relationship between a consumer and a producer and the cross 
promotion relationship between two producers. In this study, we examine the formation of featured 
channel relationships and their influence on the formation of subscription relationships.  
                                              
2 https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html 
3 http://www.edelmandigital.com/2013/03/06/youtube-announces-channel-redesign 
4 https://blog.kissmetrics.com/2013-youtube-marketing-guide/ 
  
 
Figure 2. The subscription relationship between producers and consumers and the featured channel 
relationship between producers on YouTube. 
4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
From hereafter, we refer to the proactive producer who initiates the cross-promotional link as C 
producer, and the reactive producer who receives the incoming link and then decides whether to link 
back to cross-promote C in return as F producer. As the link is directional, to achieve mutual cross-
promotion between C and F, the first stage is C-to-F linking , and the second stage is F-to-C linking 
back. In this paper, we focus on the second stage and study the formation and impacts of F-to-C link 
given the existence of C-to-F link. The expected payoff from F-to-C link for C is determined joinly by 
the probability of F-to-C link formation and its influence after formation. In this section, we develope 
our research hypotheses regarding F-to-C link formation and influence drawing upon theories on 
social influence (Ma et al. 2015; Joseph et al. 2014; Aral & Walker 2014) and homophily (Zeng & 
Wei 2013; Ma et al. 2015).  
4.1 F producers’ Decision on the Formation of F-to-C links 
The phenomenon of homophily contends that people with similar characteristics are likely to establish 
social links (McPherson et al. 2001). Similar characteristics can be intrinsic characteristics, or extrinsic 
interests, beliefs, and opinions (Zeng & Wei 2013). Homophily can play an important role in 
understanding human behavior in a network environment (Ma et al. 2015; Aral & Walker 2014). The 
mechanism underlying homophily is the selection effect (Easley &d Kleinberg 2010, p. 86), that is, 
people tend to select those with similar characteristics to form social ties. In our context, the similarity 
between F and C can be reflected in their content similarity and may affect F’s decision of linking 
back to C. Because of homophily or selection effect, F is more likely to link back to C when F and C 
produce content in the similar categories. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: F producers are more likely to link back (cross-promote C in return) when C and F produce 
content in more similar categories. 
Theories on social influence suggest that people’s behaviors are affected by others (Ma et al. 2015). 
The influence can be either friends’ active influence or general others’ passive influence as one 
observes others’ act (Ma et al. 2015; Sheldon et al. 2011; Shi et al. 2014; Zhang 2010). Information 
from friends is more influential because of the strong tie strength (Anand & Shachar 2009; Krackhardt 
1992; Tam & Ho 2005). Hence, if two people share a friend in common, they are very likely to form 
social ties between themselves. Therefore, the likelihood of F producers’ linking back to C would be 
affected by the common friends of C and F. The friends that two producers share in common make it 
easier for producers to trust each other, resulting in an increased likelihood that they will become 
friends themselves at some point in the future, as suggested by the principle of triadic closure (Easley 
& Kleinberg 2010, p. 48). More common friends also lead to greater cooperation because news of 
noncooperative behavior spreads quickly in the network, making it harder for the uncooperative actor 
to maintain friendly ties with others within the network. As such, common friends promote the 
development of cooperative norms that facilitate mutual helping relationships (Coleman 1988; 
Granovetter 1985). Both trust and cooperation are likely to increase the likelihood of linking back. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  
H2: F producers are more likely to link back (cross-promote C in return) when C and F have more 
common friends. 
Meanwhile, researchers in economics and marketing have found that people tend to follow aggregated 
decisions of a population when selecting from a set of alternatives (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 
1998; Zhang 2010). Generally speaking, people are more likely to form social links with popular 
others. As such, the standing of producer C among all producers is likely to affect the probability of 
producer F linking back to C. First of all, the high social status of C producer, usually represented by a 
large number of followers for her/her content, creates the perception that C’s content is of high quality 
and leads F to believe that C’s content is valuable for F’s followers. Second, high status C producers 
can further increase F producers’ chances of attracting content consumers by better improving the 
page ranks of F producers. According to the algorithm of eigenvector centrality used by many search 
engines, connections to high status producers contribute more to the centrality score of a producer 
(Zhang et al. 2007; Agichtein et al. 2008; Dellarocas et al. 2012; Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000; Stephen 
& Toubia 2010). Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: F producers are more likely to link back (cross-promote C in return) when C has higher status.  
4.2 The influence of F-to-C links on C producers    
F-to-C links are incoming links for C producers and serve as endorsement from F to C for F’s 
consumers and followers. First, search engines amplify the awareness effect of F-to-C links on C 
producer, because the increase of incoming links can improve the rank of a webpage under PageRank 
(Brin & Page 1988), making C’s content more discoverable for general consumers. More importantly, 
the link directly makes C producer’s content easily accessible for F’s followers (Stephen & Toubia 
2010). Therefore, being cross-promoted by other producers is generally considered to be beneficial for 
a producer. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4: The F-to-C links as cross-promotion for C would lead to more followers for C producers.  
Although the F-to-C links are generally beneficial for C’s status, the actual benefits depend on how 
many new consumers F can bring and how much they would value C’s content. In other words, the 
more F’s consumers would follow C, the more benefits F-to-C links can generate for C. The value of 
C’s content for F’s consumers depend not only on its intrinsic quality, but also on the novelty of its 
content (Shi et al. 2014). In particular, Information from diverse groups allows people to receive 
heterogeneous and novel information (Constant et al. 1996; Granovetter 1983; Hansen 1999; Levin & 
Cross 2004; Weenig & Midden 1991). In our context, when C and F produce content in similar 
categories, C’s content is less novel for F’s followers. It is often the contents transmitted via less 
similar groups that result in a greater increase in the number of newly informed users (Godes & 
Mayzlin 2009; Granovetter 1973; Shi et al. 2014). Therefore, C producers tend to attract more 
consumers or subscribers from F, when C can provide novel and valuable information that is not easily 
discovered from F. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following: 
H5:  The less similar C and F’s content are, the more F-to-C links would increase C’s followers. 
Similarly, if C and F share more common friends, they tend to be clustered into small groups (Cialdini 
& Sagarin 2005; Kruglanski & Mayseless 1990; Kardes 2002). Despite the fact that the presence of 
common links increases the level of trust (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996), it also increases the level of 
redundancy of content. However, higher levels of knowledge redundancy are less likely to provide 
access to novel information (Hansen 1999). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H6:  The fewer common friends C and F have, the more F-to-C links would increase C’s followers. 
Prior studies have shown that not all firms in the network benefit equally, resulting in firms 
aggressively bidding to secure the top positions (Ghose & Yang 2009). Where a producer is positioned 
in the network significantly influences the viewership of his/her content (Brin & Page 1998; 
Dellarocas et al. 2012). Indeed, status or popularity can be self-reinforcing, that is, higher status can 
  
help people earn significantly greater profit (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000; Stephen & Toubia 2010). As 
such, the benefits that people gain may depend on their structural importance within a network. As 
previously mentioned, followers’ valuation of the producers’ content may depend on its intrinsic 
quality. However, when limited information on producers’ quality is available, potential followers 
often observe the actions of others and extract information about the value of actions from others’ 
choices (Zhang 2010; Bikhchandani et al. 1998; Cai et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011). Therefore, high 
status C producers may attract more consumers as their status tends to be self-reinforcing (Chen et al. 
2011; Salganik et al. 2006; Zhang 2010). Hence, we hypothesize the following: 
H7: The higher status C holds, the more F-to-C links would increase C’s followers. 
5 DATA 
We collected a panel of data consisting of producers’ profile and status, featured channels, and video 
categories over a period of two months, from May 10 to July 8, 2014 from YouTube. Producers were 
sampled in a snowball fashion. We started from a random producer as a seed and added the producer’s 
featured channels into the sample set. We then kept searching for featured channels of all the 
producers in the sample list and added their featured channels into the list, and so on. We stopped 
searching for new sample producers at 7 degrees from the seed producer
5
. Our dataset contained 
complete linking information of all producers in the first 6 degrees. The existence of the 7
th
 degree was 
to ensure that the sub-network was closed. Our analyses were based on the sample of the first 6 
degrees. From day two and onwards, the list of sample producers were re-examined, and if producers 
in the first 6 degrees had added any featured channels not in the sample, then those new featured 
channels were added to the sample as well as all the featured channels reachable from the new 
producers.  
Based on daily changes of producers in our sample, we recorded producers’ daily linking information. 
That is, we recorded the changes of each producer’s links and the time when linking changes took 
place (e.g., from one-way link to mutual links). In this way, we were able to observe the benefits of 
producers in the dyad in different phases of linking formation, which allowed us to adopt a within-
subjects design. We retrieved daily information of producers in the sample, including producers’ 
number of views, number of subscribers, number of comments, number of videos, number of featured 
channels, their age and whether producers allow YouTube to recommend related channels in their 
channel pages. Also, we collected category information of producers’ all uploaded videos till the end 
of the collection period.  
Table 1. Network Characteristics in Our Sample 
On day 1, our sample contained 27,356 producers, which distributed in the 16 categories of YouTube. 
On average, a producer had 5.6 featured channels, but the distribution was uneven: 22.14% of 
                                              
5 Given the time consuming and the restriction of YouTube API, we can scrawl limited information per day. To guarantee 
complete producer information, producers’ link information and video information, we just scrawl 7 degrees. Producers in 
the 7th degree do not contain complete link information. The seed producer is treated as the 0th degree. 
Variable  Statistics 
Data collection duration 60 days 
Number of producers on day one  27,356 
Number of featured channels by day one 153,182 
Average number of featured channels per producer by day one 5.6 
Average number of featured channels established per day 240 
Number of video uploads 215,221 
  
producers had no featured channels, about 75% of producers had less than 20 featured channels, and 
less than 3% of producers had more than 20 featured channels. Among those producers, about 33% of 
them had not mutual links, while others had 1 to 60 mutual links. At the end of the period, our sample 
size increased by 6.7%, the number of featured channels increased by 9.4%, with a daily increase of 
240 featured channels and only 19.64% of producers had no featured channels. During the 60-day 
period, our sample generated 215,221 videos altogether. On average, each producer uploaded 7 videos 
during this period, with the maximum 1605 videos. Table 1 summarizes the sample’s statistics. 
6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
6.1 Measures and Variables 
In this section, we first define three important measures for our hypothesis testing: content similarity, 
common friends, and producer status and then describe key variables. As YouTube only defines 18 
categories for videos but not for producers, many producers post videos in multiple categories. As 
such, the category for a producer can be described as a vector:  
                                    ……,                             , 
where            is the category of producer   at time  ,             is the percentage of producer  ’s 
content in k
th 
(k=1,2,...,18) YouTube video category among all  ’s content. We can then use cosine 
similarity to calculate the similarity of two producers in terms of their content (Manning et al. 2009; 
Zeng & Wei 2013) as follows:  
                      
∑                          
  
   
√∑               ∑               
  
   
  
   
 
According to social tie theories (Easley & Kleinberg 2010), the role of common friends is (1) to 
increase the opportunity for two people to meet and (2) to give them a basis for trusting each other. As 
the cross-promotion relationship is directional and much weaker than traditional friend relationship, 
the common featured channels in the cross-promotion relationship shown in Figure 3(a) only represent 
the common interest of C and F in another producer A and are unlikely to increase the chance for F to 
discover C or establish basis for F to trust C. Therefore, we restrict common friends for our context to 
be those common featured channels that also feature C as in Figure 3(b). As the common friend A is 
featuring C and is featured by F, it is more likely for F to discover C among A’s featured channels. 
Meanwhile, as F trust A’s content, A trust C’s content, it is more likely for F to trust C’s content. Thus 
the modified definition can satisfy the two requirements for common friends. Given this definition,  
 
              =                                                                     
  
(a) Common interest (b) Common friend 
Figure 3. Definition of common interest (a) and common friend (b). 
The popularity of a YouTube producer can be described with either video views or subscribers. Unlike 
viewers, subscribers represent loyal viewers who are willing to receive notifications of the producer’s 
new videos and are more likely to view these new videos in the future. So we use number of 
subscribers to measure the status of a producer. As the distribution of number of subscribers among 
YouTube producers are highly skewed, we take the log transforamtion of subscribers (”+1” is used to 
maintain the observations with no subscribers). In particular, the status of a producer   is calculated as: 
                          + 1  
The main variables and their descriptions are shown in table 2, where   and   are index for producers 
and   is the index for time.  
  
Table 2.  Variables and Descriptions. 
6.2 Model Specification 
6.2.1 F producers’ Decision on the Formation of F-to-C links 
We use Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the effect of homophily and social influence on 
the probability of a cross-promoted producer cross-promoting back (Aral & Walker 2011, 2012; 
Iyengar et al. 2011; Nam et al. 2010; Van den Bulte & Lilien 2001). The model below simultaneously 
estimates the impacts of content similarity, common friends, and status, while controlling for other 
producer characteristics and weekend effects. 
        =              +                         +                    +          +
                              +      +           +              (1),  
where          is the rate of producer   featuring back producer   in return,       is the baseline rate of 
featuring back. We are most interested in three coefficients:          and    representing the percentage 
increase or decrease in the featuring back rate associated with the increase in content similarity, 
common friends, and     status respectively. Coefficients greater than 0 represent an increase in the 
rate of featuring back; coefficient less than 0 represent a decrease. Based on hypotheses H1, H2, and 
H3, we expect          and    to be all positive. 
6.2.2 The Effect of F-to-C links on C producers   
To assess the effect of F-to-C links on C producers, we employ a difference in differences (DID) 
method. In our context, the treatment is F featuring back C, the treated group is therefore the producers 
with other producers featuring back during the period, and the control group is the producers without 
any producers featuring back during the period. The treatement effect is identified by comparing the 
treated group before and after the treatment with the control group before and after the treatment. The 
subject is analysized at the two-producer pair level. Some producers in our sample initiated multiple 
cross-promotion relationships with other producers and received multiple cross-promoted producers 
cross promoting them in return. For these samples, we partition the 60-day period into several parts to 
Variables Descriptions 
                             
                {
1                                    ; 
0           ℎ  𝑤   .                                                  
 
                {
1                                              ; 
0           ℎ  𝑤   .                                                                      
 
         Status of producer   when    features    back or when    features   if    does not feature 
back   during the data period.    
                     Content similarity of   and    
                Common friends of    and   
𝑤        Equals to 1 if day t is weekend and 0 otherwise. 
      Vector of control variables for producer   ’s characteristics including log number of 
views, log number of comments, log number of videos, number of channels featuring   
(in-degree),  number of featured channels (out-degree), number of mutual links,  time 
since producer    registered with YouTube ,  whether   allows YouTube to recommend 
related channels on  ’s channel pages, log sum of in-degree channels’ views,  log sum 
of in-degree channels’ subscribers,  log sum of in-degree channels’ comments,  log 
sum of in-degree channels’ videos,  log sum of out-degree channels’ views,  log sum 
of out-degree channels’ subscribers,  log sum of out-degree channels’ comments, and  
log sum of out-degree channels’ videos. 
  
reflect different producer pair observations. As shown in Figure 3, producer C initiates cross-
promotions for two producers:    at time     and    at time    , while    started to cross promote C at  
   and    at time    . In the estimation, we use the period from the beginning to    as the observation 
for C-   pair and the period from     onwards as the observation for C-   pair. 
 
Figure 3. Partition of time for producers with multiple cross-promotions from 
cross-promoted producers. 
The baseline DID model,  
             +          +          +       +       +   𝑤        +    +   +                               (2) 
estimates the influence of producer   featuring back producer   on  ’s status, where         is the 
indicator for whether   is featuring   at time  ,         is the indicator for whether   is featuring   in 
return at time  ,      and      are used to control for producer   and   characteristics respectively, 
𝑤        is the indicator for weekend,     is the producer pair specific effect,    is the time specific 
effect, and      is the error term. To further examine how the influence of featuring back varies as 
content similarity, common friends, and producer status, we extend model (2) to include the 
interaction of the treatment indicator and the factor of interest as follows: 
             +          +          +                               +       +       +
  𝑤        +    +   +     ,                       (3) 
            +          +          +                          +       +       +
   𝑤        +    +   +     ,                       (4) 
             +          +          +                  +       +       +   𝑤        +    +
  +     ,                                                    (5) 
We are interested in coeffecients           and    . Based on Hypotheses H4, H5, H6, and H7, 
we expect   and    to be positive and   and    to be negative. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 F producers’ Decision on the Formation of F-to-C links 
Table 3 presents the results of Cox proportional hazards model (1) on F producers’ decision on the 
formation of F-to-C links. The coefficient of                    is significantly positive, suggesting 
that F producers are more likely to form F-to-C links when C and F produce content in similar 
categories than in different categories, supporting H1. The coefficient of               is positively 
significant, indicating that F producers are more likely to link back when C and F share more common 
friends. Therefore, H2 is supported. The coefficient of         is also positive, statistically significant 
when not controlling for producer characteristics, but not significant after controlling for covariates. 
Thus H3 is not supported.  
 
 
VARIABLES 
Hazard Ratio 
(SE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Model 1 
categorySimilarity 0.272** 0.232*   0.288** 
 (0.130) (0.132)   (0.132) 
commonFriends 0.849***  0.608***  0.598*** 
 (0.0786)  (0.0902)  (0.0948) 
  
LogSubi 0.0991***   0.0289 0.0153 
 (0.0210)   (0.0382) (0.0418) 
Control Variables NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,373 4,204 4,519 4,519 4,204 
Table 3.  F producers’ decision on the formation of F-to-C links. 
6.3.2 The influence of F-to-C links on C producers   
Table 4 reports the main estimation results of DID analysis of the influence of F-to-C links on C 
producers. Generally, the coefficient of      is positive and significant, suggesting that the linking-
back act has a positive and significant effect on C’s number of subscribers. Therefore, H4 is supported. 
The coefficient of     , however, is negative and significant, indicating the formation of C-to-F links 
without F-to-C links in return is detrimental for C. Column (3) shows the main specification for model 
(2), with relationship-level fixed effects. It shows that the coefficient of      is positive and 
significant, suggesting that the formation of F-to-C links increase C’s subscribers. Hence, H4 is 
supported. The coefficients of                         is significantly negative, indicating F-to-C 
links increase C’s subscribers more when C and F produce content in different categories than in 
similar categories. Hence, H5 is supported. Column (6) shows that C’s status positively moderates the 
treatment effect of linking back on C, supporting H7.  
 
                 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Model 2 
(4) 
Model 3 
(5) 
Model 4 
(6) 
Model 5 
       
T_FC   0.0493*** 0.101*** 0.0343*** -0.182*** 
   (0.00464) (0.00781) (0.00490) (0.0156) 
T_FC* categorySimilarity 
 
   -0.0856*** 
(0.00967) 
  
T_FC* commonFriends 
 
    0.0625*** 
(0.00656) 
 
T_FC* LogSubi 
 
     0.0230*** 
(0.00148) 
T_CF -0.238*** -0.106*** -0.0465*** -0.0454*** -0.0463*** -0.0486*** 
 (0.00785) (0.00712) (0.00281) (0.00278) (0.00281) (0.00281) 
feature_back 0.206*** 0.109***     
 (0.00942) (0.00842)     
Constant 0.338*** 0.597*** 3.985*** 3.429*** 3.999*** 3.867*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0538) (0.416) (0.443) (0.416) (0.415) 
 
Control variables   
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Category Fixed Effects NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Relationship Fixed effects 
Time fixed effects 
NO 
     YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
       YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
       YES 
Observations 154,271 150,135 154,271 147,923 154,240 154,271 
R-squared 0.776 0.819 0.066 0.077 0.067 0.068 
Number of R_id    3,885 3,711 3,882 
Table 4. The Effect of F-to-C links on C producers.  
According to Column (5), the coefficient of                     is significantly positive, which is 
against H6. According to our definition of common friends, the results may be because either the 
existence of common friends or C’s and F’s shared interest in these common featured channels. We 
further make an additional analysis to disentangle the effects by dividing the data sets into three parts 
(Figure 5). Part (a) contains producer pairs without common interests or common friends, part (b) 
  
contains the pairs with only common interest but no common friends, and part (c) are the pairs with 
common friends. Comparing (a) with (b) can identify the moderating effects of common interest, 
while comparing (b) with (c) identifies the moderating effects of common friends. The results are 
shown in Table 5. The coefficients of T_FC are sigificantly positive in all groups. Compared to group 
(a), the effect of linking back in group (b) is significantly larger when C and F share common interests. 
However, compared to group (b), the effect of linking back in group (c) is significantly smaller than 
that in group (b), suggesting when common interest is present, the existence of common friends would 
reduce the benefits of F-to-C links. Therefore, H6 is also supported.  The positive coefficient on T_FC* 
commonFriends in Table 4 is mainly driven by common interest instead of common friends.  
                                                                 
        (a) Placebo condition                 (b) Common interest                    (c) Common friend 
        Figure 5. Three parts of datasets. 
             
VARIABLES Placebo condition Common interests Common friend 
T_FC 0.0325*** 0.0746*** 0.0387*** 
 (0.00471) (0.0257) (0.00777) 
T_CF 0.000189 -0.321*** -0.0537*** 
 (0.00279) (0.0137) (0.00527) 
Control Variables YES YES YES 
Relationship Fixed effects 
Time fixed effects 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Observations 111,226 20,631 22,414 
R-squared 0.072 0.083 0.300 
Number of R_id 2,861 500 534 
Table 5. Additional analysis of common friends’ effects on link influence. 
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this research, we examine the social relations of content producers and the influence on their status 
in social media. In particular, we focus on the formation of cross-promotion relationships between 
producers and how such cross-promotions bring benefits for the promoted producers. Establishing 
links with other channels helps reach and attract new audiences. However, as each producer seeks to 
maximize the viewership of its own content, to attract viewership, producers need to find the right 
allies to effectively collaborate with. In this research, we explore which cross-promoted producers are 
more likely to cross-promote the initiator in return and the cross-promotions from which producers in 
return can generate more benefits for the initiator. Drawing on the existing literature on social links 
and theory on homophily and social influence, we observe a more nuanced relationship between the 
formation of cross-promotion and its benefits.  
We find that the cross-promoted producers are more likely to cross-promote the initiator in return 
when they produce content in similar categories and when they share more common friends. More 
importantly, the results show that the formation of F-to-C links is generally beneficial for C producers. 
Besides, if C and F produce content in different categories, the F-to-C links increase C’s subscribers 
more as C’s content is informational for F’s followers. By a detailed analysis, we find that the F-to-C 
links increase C’s subscribers more when C and F share fewer common friends as the overlap of 
channels may increase the influence of one another, resulting in the content redundancy. In spite of the 
  
fact that F’s linking back decision is not affected by C’s status, C producers are more likely to gain 
more followers from the formation of F-to-C links when their own status is higher. 
7.1 Contributions and Implications 
Literature on social links has mainly examined the effect of links between consumers (Brown & 
Reingen 1987; Bapna & Umjarov 2015; Anand & Shachar 2009; Krackhardt 1992; Van der Lans et al. 
2010; De Bruyn & Lilien 2008; Godes & Mayzlin, 2009; Shi et al. 2014). Depite the recent evidence 
of social links between producers, many studies have focused on the mechanisms of such links 
(Stephen & Toubia 2010; Mayzlin & Yoganarasimhan 2012). Our study contributes to the literature by 
investigating both the formation of social links and the influence of social links. The results has shown 
that although producers are more likely to establish links with similar others (i.e., with common 
friends and produce similar content), similar others are not necessarily an effective choice in 
increasing their number of subscribers. By examining the relative benefits of proactive producers, we 
have proposed that F-to-C links have a positive effect on C when C and F produce content in different 
categories and when they share fewer common friends.  
Our study has great managerial implications for both content producers and social media platforms. 
Cross-promotion and collaboration with beneficial content producers in social media can be a strategic 
advantage for producers to competete with millions of other producers. For producers, since it is 
evident that producers may gain more benefits from incoming links than from outgoing links (Ma 
2010), C producers expect that F can link back when they initiate links with F. Hence, it is important 
for producers to target the right producers to establish beneficial links. That is, producers should 
consider not only the possibility of linking back, but also the gained benefits after linking back. Based 
on our findings, although producers tend to link back when they are similar in content category as well 
as in social groups (i.e., common friends), it is the producers who produce content in different 
categories and who share few common friends that bring more subscribers to F. Producers hence 
should deploy reasonable strategies to initiate links, such as for low-status producers, since it is more 
important for them to gain more awareness from the public, they should initiate links with those who 
are more likely to link back as linking-back generally is beneficial; while for high-status producers, 
they should consider the linking strategies from a long run and select the producers whose linking 
back may bring them considerable benefits. For platform designers, the introduction of “featured 
channels” function is generally beneficial for YouTube itself because it increase the viewership as well 
as the subscription. However, the current utilization of this function may not be optimized by 
producers. The platform can recommend other producers for a producer to cross-promote based on the 
expected payoffs from each potential producer and promote the competitive collaboration among 
producers in social media.  
7.2 Limitations and Future Extensions 
This research also has a few limitations that may be addressed in the future. First, this paper only 
considers the measure of category similarity. However, we do not consider the fact that some 
categories represent closer semantic groups than others (Cattuto et al. 2008; Zeng & Wei 2013). For 
example, the “comedy” category is more related to the “Entertainment” category than to the 
“Nonprofits and Activism” category. In the future, we may consider group the more similar categories 
into one new category. Second, it is noteworthy that he snowball sampling captures all the outgoing 
links from producers in the sample but not necessarily all the incoming ones. This limitation is typical 
in studies that crawls directed graphs online (Cha et al. 2009). Future studies may try to obtain the 
complete data of the sub-network. Overall, our work is an early step towards social links among 
producers, and we are confident that future research will bring further insights in this area and offer 
much needed managerial guidance. 
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